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500 
Note 
 
Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel:  
The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade 
Jason A. Adkins∗ 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
On September 14, 2004, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit denied a motion to reopen the case of 
Roe v. Wade.2 Norma McCorvey, also known as Jane Roe,3 
brought the motion after years defending abortion rights. Re-
gretful of the effect that Roe has had on women and society,4 
McCorvey assembled a massive amount of evidence, including 
1,000 affidavits of women who testified that their abortions had 
a negative effect on their lives.5 McCorvey claimed that this in-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., M.A., 
University of St. Thomas. The author wishes to thank Liz Crouse, David 
Leishman, John Niemann, and the many others who offered comments and 
criticism. Special thanks go to Dale Carpenter and Teresa Collett, who are 
true mentors and made this Note possible. Finally, the author is grateful for 
his wife Annamarie and son Dominic, whose limitless love and patience sus-
tained him through this project. 
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Transaction 
Publishers 2005) (1881). 
 2. McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 1387 (2005); Court Rejects Motion to Overturn Roe v. Wade, CNN.COM, 
Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/14/roe.v.wade. 
 3. Shannen W. Coffin, A Tough Boat to Roe, Sept. 16, 2004, NATL REV. 
ONLINE, http://www.nationalreview.com/coffin/coffin200409160630.asp. 
 4. Id.; see also Effort to Reopen Roe v. Wade: Jane Roe: Something Ive 
Wanted Since Day One, CNN.COM, Feb. 19, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ 
LAW/02/19/roev.wade.ap.ap/index.html. 
 5. See McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 850 (Jones, J., concurring); see also Opera-
tion Outcry, Post-Abortive Womens Affidavits, http://www.operationoutcry 
.org/stories/storiesDir.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (providing a sample of the 
affidavits). In addition, McCorveys team presented new information relating 
to fetal development and viability, as well as the mechanics of the abortion in-
dustry. McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 85052 (Jones, J., concurring); see also Aff. of 
David C. Reardon, Ph. D., Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry 
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formation undermines the rationale of the original holding in 
Roe, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,6 Roe should be reopened and vacated.7 The Fifth 
Circuit denied the motion, stating that the issue was moot 
since Texas had implicitly repealed its antiabortion statute.8 
Perhaps the most interesting part of the ruling was the 
concurring opinion filed by Judge Edith Jones as an addendum 
to her own majority opinion. Judge Jones excoriated the Su-
preme Courts abortion jurisprudence and made a compelling 
case that it had to be reexamined in light of the growing 
amount of information about abortion and its adverse effects on 
women and society.9 
Judge Joness concurring opinion raises an interesting 
question: What do we do with new information that suggests 
the decision to terminate ones pregnancy has actually hurt 
women and has not validated the original justifications upon 
which the Roe decision was based, such as protecting the pa-
tient-doctor relationship, ensuring every child is a wanted child 
by reducing poverty and child abuse, and protecting the dignity 
of women?10 
 
.org/DavidReardonexpertopinion-Roe-Final.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); Aff. 
of Theresa Burke, M.A., Ph. D., Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry 
.org/ExpertAffidavit(LASTFINAL)-TheresaBurke.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 
2005). 
 6. This rule allows for relief from a judgment if that ruling was based on 
fraud, mistake, or new evidence recently discovered or not considered during 
the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 7. McCorvey, 385 F.3d at 848. 
 8. Id. at 84850. Both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit denied McCorveys motion, but on different grounds. The 
district court believed that McCorvey had not brought the Rule 60(b) motion 
within the statutory standard of a reasonable time. Id. at 84950 n.4. Over-
ruling the rationale of the district court, but affirming the decision, the Fifth 
Circuit stated that because Texas had enacted legislation putting restrictions 
on abortion and abortion providers, it had implicitly invalidated its antiabor-
tion statute, which has remained on the books. See id. at 84950. McCorvey 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, but certiorari was de-
nied. 125 S. Ct. 1387 (2005). 
 9. In her concurrence, Judge Jones highlighted the fact that the evidence 
McCorvey had gathered could not have been heard because she did not meet 
the procedural threshold necessary to reopen the case. See McCorvey, 385 F.3d 
at 850 (Jones, J., concurring). Jones then went on to heavily criticize the Su-
preme Courts exercise of raw judicial power in reserving the controversial 
question of abortion within its own purview. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 10. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 86062 
(1992) (describing various cases that have been overturned by a change in the 
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Interestingly, the Supreme Court has worked through an-
other historical moment in which the reality of lived experience 
and changed conditions necessitated a reconsideration of a fun-
damental right enshrined in the Courts jurisprudence. Lochner 
v. New York11 construed the Constitutions Fourteenth 
Amendment to include a fundamental right to contract.12 This 
right, while not absolute, could only be limited pursuant to a 
states legitimate, narrowly defined police powers.13 The right 
of contract was given what today might be called strict scru-
tiny, requiring compelling justifications to subvert the right in 
the name of legitimate legislative goals. This holding elevated 
the right of contract to fundamental status until the economic 
crises of the Great Depression led to its demise in West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish.14 
This Note argues that while constitutional principles such 
as privacy and the states police power remain the same over 
time, our understanding of how they apply in a given context 
may change depending on new knowledge, new understandings 
of old knowledge, or lived experience.15 Regarding abortion, this 
Note argues that while privacy remains an important constitu-
tional value, the Courts designation of abortion as a funda-
mental right at the expense of democratic deliberation has been 
 
factual circumstances that provided the rationale for the original holding). 
 11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 12. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 13. See id. at 5355. 
 14. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 15. This theory of constitutional adjudication resembles in spirit what 
has been called translation by Mark Tushnet and followed by Lawrence Les-
sig. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) 
(suggesting a mode of the translation method that is faithful to the original 
meaning of texts); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Cri-
tique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 80001 
(1983) (proposing that constitutional norms must be translated into new po-
litical contexts). The proposed theory of interpretation is similar to the concept 
of Burkean Constitutionalism, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conserva-
tism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 619, 688 (1994) (articulating a theory of Burkean interpretation that si-
multaneously relies on history, precedent, and emerging knowledge), as well 
as a legal process approach advocated by William Eskridge that relies on 
new application of traditional doctrines in changed circumstances, see William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrences Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to 
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 104852 (2004) 
(highlighting the importance of changed circumstances in constitutional inter-
pretation and claiming that the Founders envisioned their provisions to be re-
interpreted in light of new challenges). 
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undermined by the ever-expanding knowledge about abortion 
and its consequences. This historical moment is analogous to 
that of West Coast Hotel, which held that the right to contract 
remained a constitutional value, but one which yields in the 
face of a more sophisticated understanding of economics, such 
that democratic deliberation must be prioritized.16 Just as the 
rationale of Lochner became untenable during the New Deal 
era, so have Roe and its progeny become untenable today.17 Roe 
should be overturned and left to state legislatures to regulate 
as they see fit in light of the newest information.18 
Part I of this Note analyzes the Supreme Courts right to 
contract jurisprudence between Lochner and West Coast Hotel, 
evaluating the Courts rationale for its vigorous defense of the 
right to contract, and the Courts subsequent preference for 
democratic decision making due to changed circumstances. 
Part II outlines the holding in the companion cases of Roe v. 
Wade19 and Doe v. Bolton,20 demonstrating that they were pri-
marily cases about doctor-patient privacy and womens health, 
not sexual privacy as is commonly claimed. Furthermore, Part 
II briefly sketches the history of abortion law since Roe, focus-
ing specifically on the effect of the Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey21 decision on abortion 
regulation, and commenting on the Casey pluralitys own dis-
cussion of the Lochner line of cases. Part III describes factual 
developments that have taken place with regard to abortion 
since 1973. Finally, Part IV argues that moving from Roe to 
Casey to post-Roe is analogous to the move from Lochner to 
Nebbia v. New York22 to West Coast Hotel because the factual 
and philosophical underpinnings that provided the rationale for 
 
 16. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 38991. 
 17. See Joseph D. Grano, Teaching Roe and Lochner, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 
1973, 1973 (1996) (stating that Roe and Lochner are identical and that the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the two cases must be the same). 
 18. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 797 n.5 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (The Courts decision in 
[Lochner] was wrong because it rested on the Courts belief that the liberty to 
engage in a trade or occupation without governmental regulation was some-
how fundamentalan assessment of value that was unsupported by the Con-
stitution. I believe that [Roe]and todays decision as wellrests on similarly 
extraconstitutional assessments of the value of the liberty to choose an abor-
tion.). 
 19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 20. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 22. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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each original holding have changed and evolved in an analo-
gous fashion. Nebbia and Casey represent turning points in 
each line of cases because while preserving the essential hold-
ings of Lochner and Roe, respectively, the jurisprudential 
framework that each constructed laid the foundation for the 
subsequent reversal of the latter cases. This Note charts the 
development in the Lochner line of cases as a way of demon-
strating how long-standing precedent can be overruled in a 
principled manner due to changes in factual circumstances, 
while at the same time preserving important constitutional 
values. 
I.  TRAVELING THE ROAD FROM LOCHNER  
TO WEST COAST HOTEL 
Recent scholarship has all but debunked the theory that 
the Lochner era was dominated by laissez-faire, social-
Darwinist Justices who had to be tempered by the famous 
court-packing plan of President Roosevelt that caused the 
switch in time that saved nine.23 Instead, historians and 
commentators have argued that the shift in constitutional val-
ues from Lochner to West Coast Hotel was the result of devel-
opments in legal, economic, and political theory, as well as the 
harsh realities of economic life during the Great Depression.24 
Taken together, these factors were a powerful reason for the 
constitutional development embodied in West Coast Hotel.25 
 
 23. See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: 
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 18601910, at 12729 
(2004) (refuting the progressive myth that the Justices of the Lochner era were 
Spencerian Social Darwinists); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 36 (1998); HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 18361937, at 19398 
(1991); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 1415 
(2000); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to 
the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325 (Mi-
chael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
 24. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 7; HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 
204; WHITE, supra note 23, at 20304. 
 25. A proper understanding of the shift in constitutional values during the 
New Deal based upon changed circumstances can be found in Lawrence Les-
sigs article, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 395, 453 (1995). Lessigs account of the New Deal as constitutional 
translation is crucial because it demonstrates that both economic liberty and 
the police power remained important values; however, their application had to 
be reconsidered in light of a change of facts and the continued viability of the 
legal doctrine based on those facts. Id. at 46061 (reading West Coast Hotel in 
light of this theory). 
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A. LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 
In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York 
law that limited bakers working hours.26 While it is often 
taught as a case that enshrined the values of big business, at 
the time it was hailed as a victory for workers against the cor-
rupt machinations and Tammany Hall politics of legislators 
and labor unions.27 The case was primarily a victory for those 
workers who wanted to earn the wages for which they could 
contract. If they wanted to work longer hours than the statu-
tory limit, they could. In other words, the case was a classic ex-
ample of a dominant philosophy of economic choice and the 
moral autonomy of the individualthe right to choose ones 
hours, profession, and wage.28 
Lochner contains three competing models of economic lib-
erty: the majority opinion by Justice Rufus Peckham; the dis-
sent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.; and the dissent by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan.29 In large part, the majority 
opinion was a reaffirmation of long-cherished constitutional 
valuesthe values of the states police power and the liberty of 
contract.30 The right to make a contract in ones business en-
deavors was not new, having been enunciated almost seven 
years earlier in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.31 Lochner reaffirmed All-
geyer by holding that freedom of contract is a basic right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
 
 26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 27. See Bernstein, supra note 23, at 34748. 
 28. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 16061 (noting the importance of free-
dom of contract in upholding a system of moral accountability). 
 29. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 5456. 
[T]hree modes of reviewing legislation curtailing contractual liberty 
emerged in Lochner. Eight of the Justices shared common ideological 
commitments concerning liberty of contract and special legislation, 
and agreed on the analytic categories to be deployed to further those 
commitments. The dispute between Harlan and Peckham was over 
which branch of government should have the final say with respect to 
legislation that could reasonably be viewed as either consistent or in-
consistent with those commitments. Holmes alone rejected the com-
mitments, the categories and the vocabulary of substantive due proc-
ess. 
Id. at 56. 
 30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 5354 (describing the Courts traditional doc-
trines regarding liberty of contract and the role of the police power). 
 31. 165 U.S. 578, 59092 (1897). 
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ment.32 But at the same time, the case protected the particular 
liberty interest in an unprecedented manner. It went a step 
further by saying that it was the judiciarys role to scrutinize 
carefully legislation interfering with the freedom of contract to 
make sure that it served a valid police purpose, thus imparting 
a sort of strict scrutiny standard of review.33 
In its holding, the Court sought to protect economic liber-
ties against legislation aimed at curtailing them during the 
Populist era.34 The majority opinions elevation of one constitu-
tional value (liberty of contract) over another (legitimate police 
power action) was the establishment of a particular philosophi-
cal anthropology35 that would guide the Court for over thirty 
years in deciding cases dealing with economic liberties.36 At the 
heart of Lochner is the vision of the human person as one with 
 
 32. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 33. Id. at 56. 
 34. See id. at 64; see also BAILEY, supra note 23, at 147 (noting that the 
Justices of the Lochner era viewed social welfare legislation as inimical to both 
the individual and the common good because it produced corrupted individuals 
and immoral or antisocial behavior). If the police power were to go unchecked, 
the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment was to have no meaning. This was 
less a defense of business interests than the Courts attempt to salvage a par-
ticular understanding of political economy. See id. at 113 (describing the two 
axiomatic principles of political economy that guided the Court). 
 35. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 142 (noting the connection between eco-
nomic liberty, character, and human development that was a bedrock principle 
of Lochner-era political economy). For the pro-Lochner Justices, the last relics 
of the neoclassical school of political economy, economics was less a science of 
empirical fact than a branch of moral philosophy. Thus, economics was tied to 
philosophical conceptions about rights and freedoms, rather than to discus-
sions of wealth maximization, development, and social welfare. See id. (de-
scribing the academic moral philosophy that integrated economic theory and 
psychology into an anthropology that valued freedom, autonomy, and moral 
virtue). However, as the science of economics developed after Lochner, the 
Courts jurisprudence developed with it. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 
204; Lessig, supra note 25, at 42022, 46869 (describing how changes in eco-
nomic theory led to a translation of constitutional doctrines into new con-
texts). Changes in theory, as well as in facts, are also catalysts for a reorienta-
tion of enduring constitutional values. See id. at 453, 46061. 
 36. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 171 (The language of substantive 
due process spoke not of substantive regulatory standards but rather of indi-
vidual constitutional right. Individuals were said to possess a liberty of con-
tract that gave them freedom from governmental interferencein this case, 
freedom to make choices affecting individual economic status.); id. at 204 
(The courts of the substantive due process era were guided by prevailing sci-
entific doctrines much as courts are today. . . . When the dominant American 
economic ideology changednot until the first three decades of the twentieth 
centurythe legal ideology followed close behind.). 
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a degree of autonomy and freedomone might argue a natural 
rightto contract his labor and services in the way he wishes, 
subject only to reasonable police power limitations.37 
In a famous dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes criti-
cized the Court for reading a particular political and economic 
theory into the Constitution.38 Furthermore, he criticized what 
would later come to be known as substantive due process be-
cause it was an invitation to read rights into the Constitution 
that were not really there.39 In terms of the validity of economic 
legislation, Holmes believed that the Constitution required 
complete deference to the legislatures except in egregious viola-
tions of rights that had always been part of the nations tradi-
tions.40 Holmess theory left little room for the protection of 
economic liberties and even implied that they cannot be found 
within the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
While the majority opinion and Holmess dissent represent 
the polar extremes in the debate over substantive due process, 
it was Justice Harlans approach in Lochner that later provided 
the rationale for its eventual reversal in West Coast Hotel. 
Harlans dissent is notable because, while it acknowledges the 
competing constitutional values, it seeks to give priority to leg-
islative enactments rather than judicially created liberty inter-
 
 37. See id. at 74 (Liberty of contract and other rights recognized under 
the fourteenth amendment were not merely economic rights but moral and re-
ligious rights as well. Laissez-faire ideology was an important part of the reli-
gious individualism and self-determination that developed in America during 
the early nineteenth century.). 
 38. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 7476 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also HOVENK-
AMP, supra note 23, at 182 (The Progressives rejection of classicism provided 
the excuse, not the reason, for the passage of reform legislation. But Holmess 
accusation that the majority relied on an obsolete economic theory is not 
nearly as important or as interesting as his recognition that it relied on an 
economic theory, whether right or wrong, obsolete or current.). 
 39. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 7476 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 40. See id. at 7576 (I think that the word liberty in the 14th Amend-
ment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a domi-
nant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily 
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles 
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.). 
 41. Eventually, Holmess vision of extreme judicial deference in economic 
matters would become part of constitutional law in the case of Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard would signal the very end of economic sub-
stantive due process and the almost total dominance of the police power. See 
JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONALISM 14445 (2003) (After West Coast Hotel, the liberty of contract 
is never used again by the Supreme Court to strike a statute . . . .). 
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ests.42 Rather than subjecting regulations of individual liberties 
to strict scrutiny, Harlan advocated judicial deference to the 
legislature as the chief finder of fact and endowed with the 
most institutional competence.43 While protecting individual 
liberties remained an important constitutional value, that goal 
would be subject to the common good, and only arbitrary and 
unreasonable regulations would be struck down.44 
It would take some time for Harlans theory to gain trac-
tion as the economic conditions for the twenty-five years follow-
ing Lochner seemed to confirm the validity of the neoclassical 
economics espoused by the majority of the Justices.45 However, 
as the economic situation deteriorated and neoclassical political 
economy waned as a legitimate theory,46 Harlans approach be-
came a plausible alternative. Its merit was that it protected in-
dividual liberties without abandoning the constitutional doc-
trine that there were unenumerated economic liberties in the 
 
 42. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 7273 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 43. See id. at 68; see also STONER, supra note 41, at 138 (Harlans 
Lochner dissent is not a dispute with the Court over jurisprudence, but a de-
bate over whether the New York law was valid as a health regulation 
. . . against a majority convinced that the health rationale was a pretense cov-
ering favoritism for the laboring class.). 
 44. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67; see also John Marshall Harlan, Supreme 
Court Justice, Remarks at a banquet given by the bar of the Sixth Federal 
Circuit Court at Cincinnati (Oct. 3, 1896), in The Supreme Court of the United 
States and its Work, 30 AM. L. REV. 900 (1896), reprinted in part in AN AUTO-
BIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT: OFF-THE-BENCH COMMENTARY BY THE 
JUSTICES 118, 11821 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1963); BAILEY, supra note 23, at 
12627 (describing how Harlan attacked unrestrained majoritarianism, but 
sought to protect the will of the people as embodied in the legislature). 
 45. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 77 (More than one Supreme Court 
justice attacked wage and hour legislation by arguing that the laboring class 
did not want such laws.). For example, in Adkins v. Childrens Hospital 
(1923) Justice Sutherland took judicial notice of the fact that wages in the 
United States were increasing; as a result, minimum wage laws were bad pol-
icy. Id. at 184. While Sutherland continued to uphold the right to contract 
and vigorously dissented in West Coast Hotel, his opinions demonstrate an un-
derstanding of the need to apply constitutional doctrines to changing scien-
tific, economic and technological circumstances and knowledge. Thus, in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 39091 (1926), Sutherland 
upheld a municipal zoning plan on the grounds that the community has an 
interest in protecting the health of its citizens, citing the need for constitu-
tional adaptation to modern urban life. See also STONER, supra note 41, at 
14142 (noting the similarity between Sutherlands holdings and Hughess 
opinion in West Coast Hotel). 
 46. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 468 (describing the displacement of non-
interventionist economic theory during the 1930s). 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 At the 
same time, these liberties, which were usually judicial gloss on 
a text,48 would be subject to the common good. Of course, when 
Lochner was overruled, the pro-Lochner Justices interpreted 
their colleagues to be saying that the Constitution changes over 
time.49 They assumed that the Constitution reflected fixed prin-
ciples and believed other Justices did as well. However, it was 
not that constitutional principles or doctrines changedthere 
were economic liberties in the Due Process Clause, and the po-
lice power was an important political tool to achieve the legisla-
tive endsbut changes in the economic conditions of society 
forced a new application of them.50 
B. ADKINS V. CHILDRENS HOSPITAL OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
The holding of Adkins v. Childrens Hospital of the District 
of Columbia51 strengthened Lochner and provided a farther-
reaching defense of the liberty of contract. While recognizing 
the validity of the states police power, the Court asserted that 
a minimum wage law for adult women served no valid police 
purpose.52 In addition, the Court stated that the right to con-
tract about ones affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by this [Due Process] clause, [and] is settled by the 
decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question.53 
While in some cases interference with the right to contract was 
found to be appropriate,54 the Court rested its holding on a par-
ticular philosophical anthropology of the human person and 
 
 47. See BAILEY, supra note 23, at 16973 (outlining Harlans dissent and 
stating that he preferred leaving to the legislature the task of finding wise 
means to fulfill its obligations to society). 
 48. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 24344. 
 49. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Suther-
land, J., dissenting) (It is urged that the question involved should now receive 
fresh consideration, among other reasons, because of the economic conditions 
which have supervened; but the meaning of the Constitution does not change 
with the ebb and flow of economic events.). But cf. supra note 45 (noting Jus-
tice Sutherlands willingness to adapt constitutional doctrines to the needs of 
modern life). 
 50. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 91. 
 51. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379, 388400 (1937). 
 52. Id. at 54445, 55361. 
 53. Id. at 545. 
 54. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 42123 (1908) (upholding a 
maximum-hours law for women). 
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that theorys consonant natural rights.55 Justice Sutherland 
grounded his opinion in Adkins in moral terminology upholding 
the liberty of contract, along with the societal good that was to 
be achieved by sustaining the logic of economic choice.56 
In another strong dissent, Justice Holmes decried the deci-
sion for finding a fundamental constitutional right in what was 
merely a gloss on the constitutional text. He noted that, 
[c]ontract is not specially mentioned in the text that we have 
to construe. It is merely an example of doing what you want to 
do, embodied in the word liberty.57 Justice Holmes articulated 
a powerful critique of substantive due process jurisprudence: it 
reads rights into the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendments 
Due Process Clause that simply do not exist. 
C. NEBBIA V. NEW YORK 
Nebbia v. New York58 called into question the holdings in 
Lochner and Adkins. In Nebbia, the Court upheld price controls 
on milk established by the New York Milk Control Board.59 The 
case demonstrated that the orientation of constitutional values 
embodied in Lochner and Adkins began to shift in the face of 
the political factors that allegedly led to the Courts change of 
heart about protecting economic liberties.60 Nebbia was the 
first sign of the jurisprudential transition that would take place 
in West Coast Hotel.61 
Prior to Nebbia, the Court had erected a number of formal 
categories to distinguish particular types of economic activity.62 
It did so to maintain both the perception and the reality that 
some economic activity was beyond regulation, while upholding 
Populist-era social legislation. The court wished to preserve the 
 
 55. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 54546, 561; see also BAILEY, supra note 23, at 
16972 (explaining the philosophical rationale behind the holding in Lochner). 
 56. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 55961; cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 2526 
(1915) (holding that it was not a legitimate exercise of the police power for the 
government to attempt to equalize bargaining power between employer and 
employee); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (noting that it is 
not within the functions of governmentat least in the absence of contract be-
tween the partiesto compel any person in the course of his business and 
against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another . . . .). 
 57. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 58. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 59. Id. at 53639. 
 60. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 7983. 
 61. See id. at 8283. 
 62. See id. at 4759. 
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classical jurisprudence that had guided the nations affairs and 
culture since the Civil War, without sacrificing its popular le-
gitimacy by striking down important legislation. This frame-
work allowed the Court to appear principled while being ex-
tremely pragmatic. Although this jurisprudence may have 
worked in a simple economy, with the Industrial Revolution 
and the advent of sophisticated financial instruments, those 
distinctions appeared arbitrary.63 
The so-called principle of neutrality was an embodiment 
of the Courts pre-Nebbia framework. Regulation of business 
and industry that had a particular public purpose or nature 
could be regulated under the police power because a public in-
terest was involved.64 However, the principle of neutrality pro-
hibited the Court from meddling in purely private business af-
fairs because judicial umpiring would give advantage to one 
economic actor over another.65 Not only would this be unfair 
from a legal standpoint, it would violate prevailing economic 
orthodoxy.66 However, as economic affairs and regulation be-
came more complex, these categories were not particularly use-
ful and handicapped what was considered a vital New Deal 
regulatory agenda.67 
 
 63. See id. at 5255 (describing the incoherence of maintaining a system 
of formal categories of economic regulation). Similar problems would plague 
the Courts trimester framework established in Roe, and later abandoned in 
the abortion-era equivalent of Nebbia: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey. See infra notes 98115 and accompanying text. 
 64. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 5455. 
 65. See id. at 47; see also WHITE, supra note 23, at 203 (describing Cush-
mans analysis of the public/private distinction and the principle of neutrality 
in the Courts jurisprudence). 
 66. Cf. CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 47 (discussing distinctions between 
public and private spheres and the principle of neutrality). Police powers ju-
risprudence from the Founding to the Lochner era was limited by the principle 
of radical equality, strengthened after the Civil War amendments, which 
sought to prevent a factional politics. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTI-
TUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 6164 (1993). Thus, during the rapid industrialization of the 
nineteenth century, courts took extreme care not to allow legislation that fa-
vored one group over another. See id. This sacrosanct principle remained in-
tact until the fact of increasing economic inequality undermined the theory 
and made it untenable. Nebbia is the first sign of the new constitutional era 
ushered in by West Coast Hotel. See generally id. at 61146 (describing the 
tension between judges that maintained the classical jurisprudence, and the 
unstable economic conditions and class tensions that appeared to necessitate a 
break with the old order and allow class-based legislation). Liberty of contract 
was linked inextricably with class-based legislation. Id. at 114. 
 67. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 53133 (1934). 
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The Nebbia Court tore down this wall between private and 
public businesses by recasting the phrase affected with a pub-
lic interest, as simply meaning subject to the exercise of the 
police power.68 Thus, while regulations could not be unreason-
able and arbitrary (the Court still maintained its commitment 
to long-standing constitutional values), every sort of private 
business could theoretically come under the purview of the po-
lice power.69 The Court in Nebbia confined itself to the specific 
question of whether New York State could put price controls on 
milk sales, deemed the milk industry to have a significant pub-
lic component, and left the broader question of whether all 
business activities were subject to the police power for another 
day.70 However, Nebbia lowered the level of scrutiny some leg-
islative enactments would receive, giving them deferential re-
view along the model of Harlans dissent in Lochner, and per-
haps even going a step further by noting the Courts 
institutional incompetence to deal with such matters.71 
D. WEST COAST HOTEL CO. V. PARRISH 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish72 sounded the death knell 
for Lochner and Adkins. Upholding a state minimum wage law 
for women, the Court specifically overruled Adkins and repudi-
ated the judicial gloss on the liberty cited in the Due Process 
Clause that had been the basis for the previously asserted right 
to contract.73 The Court stated: 
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of 
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of 
law . . . . Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to 
the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in 
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the commu-
nity is due process.74 
Justice Hughes stated that changes in economic conditions 
undermined the logic of Adkins and required its reversal.75 Fur-
 
 68. Id.  
 69. See id. at 53637. 
 70. See CUSHMAN, supra note 23, at 79. 
 71. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 53638; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 598 (2d ed. 2002) (describing how 
the Nebbia decision signaled the imminent demise of Lochner by calling into 
question its basic premises). 
 72. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 73. See id. at 39798. 
 74. Id. at 391. 
 75. Id. at 38991. 
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thermore, the Court held that economic conditions must deter-
mine the reasonableness of the protective power of the state.76 
Thus, the tension between fundamental rights and the common 
good as embodied in the states police power was resolved by a 
thorough analysis of the social context and relevant facts.77 
The rhetoric of West Coast Hotel is an inversion of the con-
stitutional values established in Lochner and Adkins,78 and an 
adoption of the Harlan dissent in Lochner.79 While recognizing 
the importance of liberty in general, the Court gave priority to 
the communitarian impulses embodied in police power regula-
tions.80 Whereas the Court gave individual liberty highest pri-
ority and protection in Lochner and Adkins, the Court in West 
Coast Hotel placed a greater premium on the use of law as an 
instrument of social policy, embodied in legislation designed to 
protect the public welfare.81 While individual states could pro-
tect the right to contract on the rationale of Lochner, the work- 
 
 
 76. Id. at 390. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See generally Lessig, supra note 25, at 45372 (describing the process 
through which the New Deal Court translated constitutional values into a 
new context, reprioritizing the liberty of contract and the scrutiny given to po-
lice power legislation). 
 79. Prompted by Harlans Lochner dissent, a movement arose to create a 
more sociological jurisprudence grounded in hard facts to assess the reason-
ableness of legislationthe same rationale that Justice Hughes would have 
used to overturn Adkins in West Coast Hotel. See GILLMAN, supra note 66, at 
13246. 
 80. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397400 (1937); see 
also STONER, supra note 41, at 144 (noting Hughess ability to accomplish a 
constitutional revolution by working within established precedent). 
 81. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 399400. West Coast Hotel and 
other post-1937 cases represented a change in jurisprudence that caused the 
rise of the administrative/regulatory welfare state. Rather than understanding 
law as embodying the metaphysical truths of natural law that judges tried to 
find through the common law process, judges began to understand law as a 
creature of both policy and statute. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 16770 (not-
ing the various features of classical judicial formalism). Law was essentially 
made by legislatures and judges adapting the Constitution to the demands of 
current American society. Id. at 173. Furthermore, liberty and equality
bedrock principles of classical jurisprudencewere now thought to be impos-
sible without a basic level of economic security. In order to protect important 
constitutional values, traditional doctrines had to be reapplied to new con-
texts. See GILLMAN, supra note 66, at 15253. These shifts in theory provided 
the underpinnings of the reorientation of constitutional values in the West 
Coast Hotel decision. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 46162 (stating that devel-
opments in legal and economic theory were part of the process of translating 
constitutional values during the New Deal era). 
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ing model with regard to the Federal Constitution became def-
erence to the state legislatures and Congress. 
One can see in the cases from Lochner to West Coast Hotel 
a shift in emphasis of particular constitutional values in light 
of the economic situation that faced the nation. An examination 
of the abortion cases and the growth in knowledge about abor-
tion in general since 1973 is necessary before exploring why the 
experience of the Lochner era provides an important lesson and 
precedent for reexamining the Courts abortion jurisprudence 
since Roe. 
II.  THE LOGIC WITHIN: ROE & CASEY  
CHART THEIR OWN DEMISE? 
The companion cases Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton that 
overturned the abortion laws of all fifty states in 1973 were just 
two of the many challenges to state abortion laws working their 
way through the courts.82 While the fight over abortion has 
been framed as a struggle over womens equality and sexual 
privacy, Roe and Doe were originally conceived in the courts as 
a question of doctor-patient privacy.83 The abortion question 
rose to national prominence primarily because of health con-
cerns affecting women and the purported ban on doctors from 
dealing with them effectively, in some cases even being prose-
cuted for providing abortions to women with real health risks.84 
Doctors needed to help their patients survive, and women had 
the right to receive an abortion if the woman and her doctor so 
decided. The holdings of Roe and Doe were more about giving 
doctors options in treatment than winning a battle for womens 
sexual freedom.85 This is particularly important because if Roe  
 
 
 82. Lucinda M. Finley, The Story of Roe v. Wade: From a Garage Sale for 
Womens Lib, to the Supreme Court, to Political Turmoil, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW STORIES 359, 36061 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
 83. See id. at 38997. 
 84. Id. at 36774. 
 85. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opinions, had served as legal counsel 
to the Mayo Clinic and was sensitive to the needs of physicians. See Linda 
Greenhouse, The Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 10, 2005, at 30. 
Blackmun also incorporated data regarding the ability of medical professionals 
to provide safe abortions into his opinion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148
50 (1973). For a discussion of how early litigation efforts to overturn state 
abortion laws focused on doctors rather than pregnant women because it was 
believed that courts would be more favorable to a claim that their professional 
discretion was being violated, see Finley, supra note 82, at 376. 
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and Doe were grounded in health concerns that have ceased to 
exist, the logic of West Coast Hotel means their holdings are 
now in doubt. 
A. ROES RATIONALE 
Griswold v. Connecticut86 laid the foundation for Roe. In 
Griswold, the Court stated that there was a right of privacy 
protected under the penumbra of rights outlined in the Bill of 
Rights.87 A concurring opinion found a right to marital privacy 
in the Ninth Amendment.88 Justice Harry Blackmuns opinion 
in Roe affirmed this basic holding, but went beyond the general 
notion of privacy outlined in Griswold, stating: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendments concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth Amendments reservation of 
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a womans decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.89 
The real rationale behind the broad strokes painted in Roe 
are found in Doe, which includes an extensive thesis on the im-
portance of physician control over whether a woman should 
have an abortion.90 The chief accomplishment of Roe and Doe, 
at least in Justice Blackmuns eyes, was to give a broader scope 
of discretion to physicians when dealing with pregnant 
women.91 However, Roes and Does fundamental concern for 
 
 86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 87. Id. at 48485. 
 88. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 90. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198201 (1973). 
 91. Greenhouse, supra note 85, at 30 (noting that Blackmun found abor-
tion restrictions troublesome not because they interfered with womens rights, 
but because they put doctors at risk). Beyond the basic physical health reasons 
why women might need an abortion, Justice Blackmuns opinion noted some 
normative considerations surrounding the psychological problems attached to 
having an unwanted child, as well as the affect that birthing the child may 
have on the quality of life of both mother and child. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. How-
ever, Blackmuns assumptions have since been called into doubt. See George 
A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United 
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 277 (1996) (concluding that access to abortion and 
the availability of contraception have caused a decline in the number of mar-
riages after pregnancy which accounts for a significant fraction of the in-
crease in out-of-wedlock first births); see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT, INDEX OF 
LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS 46 (1994) (noting a thirty-year increase in il-
legitimate children); Philip Ney, M.D., Relationship Between Abortion and 
Child Abuse, 24 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 610, 61017 (1979) (stating that the guilt 
from abortions has increased child battering of subsequent children by par-
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womens health is problematic if abortion lacks the effects it 
was once believed to have.92 
While asserting that the right of privacy found in the lib-
erty of the Due Process Clause was broad enough to encompass 
a right to terminate ones pregnancy, Roe also asserted that 
this right was not absolute.93 The Court said that the state had 
an interest in the protection of maternal health after the first 
trimester, as well as the protection of potential life after the 
fetus became viable.94 States could regulate abortions after the 
first trimester to protect maternal health, and outlaw abortions 
after the third trimester as long as an exception was made for 
those abortions necessary to preserve the health or life of the 
mother.95 But, according to Doe, health could mean almost 
any rationale of which the physician could conceive, making the 
states ability to outlaw some abortions virtually nonexistent.96 
The Court defined health to mean anything where medical 
judgment is exercised in the light of all factorsphysical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the womans agerelevant 
to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to 
health. 97 
B. CASEY REFORMULATES ROE 
For twenty years following Roe, state abortion laws were 
continuously challenged, and most of those laws were over-
turned,98 except for statutes that prevented government fund-
ing of abortion.99 However, when it appeared Roe might be in  
 
 
ents). 
 92. Cf. Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that he is 
troubled that the Court took judicial notice of scientific data). 
 93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
 94. Id. at 16263. 
 95. Id. at 16364. 
 96. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (holding un-
constitutional a Minnesota parental notification statute); City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (striking an Ohio statute 
that required any abortion after the first trimester to be performed in a hospi-
tal); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) 
(finding unconstitutional Missouris parental consent statute for minors seek-
ing abortions). 
 99. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 31718 (1980) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which banned federal Medicaid fund-
ing of abortions except in limited instances). 
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danger due to the Courts changing composition, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed it in Planned Parenthood of Southwestern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.100 Casey is notable not only because it 
abandoned the trimester framework (which relied on practical 
considerations about fetal and womens health) in favor of the 
undue burden standard,101 but also because it made a shift 
from Blackmuns prudential rationale for the abortion right to 
one relying on philosophical conceptions of what freedom 
means, and abortions place within that definition.102 
The plurality opinion in Casey grounded its holding in the 
notion that stare decisis must be respected, and that the pres-
ence of liberalized abortion laws had created a reliance interest 
in millions of women who had ordered their lives around the 
fact that abortion was an available option to them.103 Further-
more, the Court sweepingly stated, [a]t the heart of liberty is 
the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.104 The Court 
went beyond a mere assertion of constitutional values and stat-
ed that abortion is part of the very nature of freedom itself. 
This mirrors the language employed in Adkins by Justice Suth-
erland, who asserted the right to choose ones working condi-
tions was integral to the nature of liberty.105 
The undue burden standard, purporting to be a lower 
level of scrutiny than the normal strict scrutiny applied to 
fundamental rights, has allowed only minimal regulation of 
abortion.106 The Court defined the undue burden standard as 
any regulation that places substantial obstacles in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.107 Most regulatory statutes have 
been struck down or eviscerated because of Caseys ruling that  
abortion regulations require an exception for the life and the 
 
 100. 505 U.S. 833, 86970 (1992). 
 101. Id. at 873, 87677. 
 102. See id. at 86979. 
 103. Id. at 85456. 
 104. Id. at 851. 
 105. See Adkins v. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia 261 U.S. 
525, 54546 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 388400 (1937). 
 106. The Casey decision actually upheld Pennsylvanias twenty-four-hour 
waiting period for abortions, the requirement that physicians inform women of 
the availability of information about the fetus, a parental consent require-
ment, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. Id. at 879901. 
 107. Id. at 877. 
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health of the mother.108 While states have passed parental-
notification laws, womens right to know laws, waiting peri-
ods, and other small measures, these regulations are generally 
limited by the requirement of a health exception. Because of 
Does construction of the term health, these laws are incapa-
ble of limiting abortions.  
Interestingly, the Casey decision included a discussion of 
the line of cases between Lochner and West Coast Hotel.109 The 
Court described how changed circumstances in the Lochner line 
of cases warranted a change in the existing doctrine.110 In 1937 
it seemed clear that the interpretation of contractual freedom 
protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual as-
sumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated mar-
ket to satisfy minimum levels of human welfare.111 The plural-
ity opinion in Casey went on to say that not only did the change 
in facts warrant a new choice of constitutional principle, but 
required it.112 [T]he clear demonstration that the facts of 
economic life were different from those previously assumed 
warranted the repudiation of the old law.113 
With regard to abortion, however, the plurality noted this 
change had not taken place in the nations consciousness, and 
overturning Roe on the grounds that the facts had changed 
would not have been a legitimate reorientation of constitutional 
principles.114 In other words, the Court implied that overturn-
ing a prior decision gains a certain degree of legitimacy when 
society has generally agreed that the facts providing the ra-
tionale for the original holding have changed.115 The Court, 
however, made no attempt to thoroughly examine whether the 
facts and societal attitudes about abortion had actually 
changed. 
 
 
 108. See id. at 879; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) 
(holding that Casey requires all abortion regulations to have exceptions for the 
life or health of the mother). 
 109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 86162. 
 110. Id. at 862. 
 111. Id. at 86162. 
 112. Id. at 862. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 864. 
 115. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 107880 (noting the wisdom of a juris-
prudence that domesticate[s] culture clashes rather than igniting them, as 
did Roe v. Wade). 
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III.  THE FACT IS . . .  
THE AFTERMATH OF ROE SINCE 1973 
An emerging body of research chronicling the effects of le-
galized abortion on women and society raises the question of 
whether Roe was profoundly mistaken and, if so, whether it 
should be overturned and abortion regulation left to the states. 
The conclusion of this Note is that these new facts satisfy the 
standard of review referred to in Casey for overturning long-
standing constitutional precedent and therefore warrant a 
change in existing abortion jurisprudence. 
A. WOMENS HEALTH 
The opinions in Roe and Doe stressed autonomyfor doc-
tors and patients bothto make medical decisions.116 In certain 
circumstances, abortion was seen as a preferred alternative to 
childbirth, and thus doctors, it was thought, needed the ability 
to advise patients to choose this procedure.117 However, recent 
evidence has undermined the rationale for allowing abortion as 
a legitimate medical practice.118 
Roes rationale for only permitting state regulation after 
the first trimester was that abortion appeared statistically 
safer than childbirth if performed during the first trimester.119 
In his concurring opinion in Doe, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
expressed concern that the opinion had tied itself too closely to 
 
 116. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 15354, 16566 (1973). 
 117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149. 
 118. While there is an abundance of new information regarding abortions 
effect on women, reexamining the information available in 1973 proves quite 
surprising. In a Roe brief filed by a coalition of members of the American Col-
lege of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), the doctors noted that [a]ny con-
sideration of the safety of legally induced abortions must consider the full 
range of medical complications including early and late physical and psycho-
logical complications, as well as maternal and child mortality. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the Am. Coll. 
of Obstetrics & Gynecology at 2, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) 
(emphasis added). These doctors proceeded to describe a number of conse-
quences of legal induced abortion including higher mortality rates, pelvic in-
fection, perforation of the uterus, coma or convulsions, higher risk of prema-
ture delivery, sterility, ectopic pregnancies, endometriosis, and psychological 
breakdown. Id. at 3258. The doctors of ACOG also rebutted the claims of the 
appellants briefs that it had been definitively shown that abortion was safer 
than childbirth. Id. 
 119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
ADKINS_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:52:55 AM 
520 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:500 
 
medical statistics,120 which could theoretically be disproved. 
His point was particularly prescient. It appears that one of the 
underlying assumptions of Roes trimester frameworkthat 
first trimester abortions are safer than childbirthwas wrong. 
Current studies demonstrate that childbirth is safer than abor-
tions,121 especially considering the negative physical and men-
tal consequences that can follow a woman after an abortion.122 
In January 2003, a team of researchers published a study 
in the journal Obstetrical & Gynecological Survey (OGS) 
chronicling long-term physical and psychological harm from 
abortion.123 The OGS researchers found that women who have 
had abortions face a number of long-term consequences directly 
linked to abortion,124 including higher rates of psychological 
trauma125 involving depression, emotional distress, and delib-
erate self-harm;126 suicide;127 placenta previa;128 pre-term birth 
 
 120. Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 121. See David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated With Abortion Com-
pared to ChildbirthA Review of New and Old Data and the Medical and Le-
gal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 279, 281 (2004); see also 
ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMENS HEALTH AFTER ABOR-
TION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 8595 (2002) (providing 
an overview of various studies comparing the safety of childbirth and abor-
tion). 
 122. See ROYAL COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, THE CARE 
OF WOMEN REQUESTING INDUCED ABORTION (Sept. 2004), available at http:// 
www.rcog.org.uk/resources/Public/pdf/induced_abortionfull.pdf (reporting that 
the immediate physical complication rate of induced abortion was at minimum 
eleven percent); see also Shai Linn et al., The Relationship Between Induced 
Abortion and Outcome of Subsequent Pregnancies, 146 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 136, 140 (1983) (describing pregnancy complications that occur 
in later pregnancies with women who have had abortions). 
 123. John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological 
Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, 58 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL 
SURV. 67 (2003). 
 124. Id. at 6768, 7476. 
 125. See id. at 74; see also JOEL OSLER BRENDE, M.D. FAPA, Post-Trauma 
Sequelae Following Abortion and Other Traumatic Events (1994) http://www 
.lifeissues.net/writers/air/air_vol7no1_1994.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) 
(noting that postabortion stress resembles psychological trauma incurred from 
the death of loved ones). 
 126. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 74; see also Priscilla K. Coleman et 
al., State-Funded Abortions Versus Deliveries: A Comparison of Outpatient 
Mental Health Claims Over Four Years, 72 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 141, 141 
(2002) (comparing the use of mental health services by women who have had 
abortions and those who have given birth and finding the rate of mental 
health claims for women who have had abortions was 17 percent higher); 
Jesse R. Cougle et al., Depression Associated with Abortion and Childbirth: A 
Long-Term Analysis of the NLSY Cohort, 9 MED. SCI. MONITOR CR 157, 157 
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of subsequent children;129 low birth weight in subsequent chil-
dren;130 and breast cancer.131 Numerous studies have validated 
 
(2003) (claiming that women who have had abortions suffer from a signifi-
cantly higher risk of clinical depression); Jesse R. Cougle et al., Generalized 
Anxiety Following Unintended Pregnancies Resolved Childbirth and Abortion: 
A Cohort Study of the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, 19 J. ANXIETY 
DISORDERS 137, 141 (2005) (noting higher rates of generalized anxiety in 
women who have had abortions). 
 127. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 74; see also RING-CASSIDY & GEN-
TLES, supra note 121, at 189216 (discussing the links between abortion and a 
significantly increased risk of suicide); Mika Gissler, Suicides After Pregnancy 
in Finland, 1987-94, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 143334 (1996), available at 
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/313/7070/1431 (noting that the risk 
of suicide was three times higher after abortion than childbirth); David C. 
Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Pregnancy Outcome: A Record Linkage 
Study of Low Income Women, 95 S. MED. J. 834, 83637 (2002) (stating that 
the risk of suicide was twice as high after elective abortion). 
 128. See Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 70 (noting that the research team 
found that induced abortion increases the risk of placenta previa in subse-
quent pregnancies by thirty percent). 
 129. See id. at 75; see also Brent Rooney & Byron C. Calhoun, Induced 
Abortion and Risk of Later Premature Births, 8 J. AM. PHYSICIANS AND SUR-
GEONS 46, 46 (2003) (claiming that forty-nine studies of abortion and subse-
quent premature births have established with ninety-five percent confidence 
that there is a connection between the two). 
 130. Thorp et al., supra note 123, at 75. 
 131. Id. at 77 (claiming that the connection between abortion and breast 
cancer is strong enough that as a matter of professional ethics, women seeking 
abortions should be notified about the possibility of an abortion-breast cancer 
link). The abortion-breast cancer link is highly controversial, with a plethora 
of studies present on both sides of the debate. Proponents of the link claim 
that abortion increases the chance of breast cancer by thwarting the well-
recognized protection the first full-term pregnancy provides against breast 
cancer. See id. Additionally, proponents of the link make the more controver-
sial claim that the proper interaction of hormones and breast tissue during 
pregnancy is thwarted by induced abortion. See Angela Lanfranchi, The Abor-
tion-Breast Cancer Link: The Studies and the Science, in THE COST OF 
CHOICE: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 72, 7579 (Erika Ba-
chiochi ed., 2004). For further studies linking abortion and breast cancer, see 
id. at 7286; RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 1734 (summariz-
ing many of the studies demonstrating a link between induced abortion and 
breast cancer); Katrina Armstrong et al., Assessing the Risk of Breast Cancer, 
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 564, 566 (2000) (citing breast cancer as a risk of abor-
tion); Joel Brind et al., Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk Factor for 
Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. EPIDEMIOL-
OGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 481 (1996); Janet R. Daling et al., Risk of Breast 
Cancer Among Young Women: Relationship to Induced Abortion, 86 J. NATL 
CANCER INST. 1584 (1994) (the journal article that started the controversy); 
and John Kindley, The Fit Between the Elements for an Informed Consent 
Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with In-
creased Breast Cancer Risk, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1595 (1998). But see Mads Mel-
bye et al., Induced Abortion and the Risk of Breast Cancer, 336 NEW ENG. J. 
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the findings of the OGS team.132 Abortion has also been linked 
to higher rates of sexually transmitted diseases133 and eating 
disorders,134 as well as drug and alcohol abuse.135 Sadly, homi-
cide has become the leading cause of death for pregnant 
women,136 which may be largely due to their refusal to procure 
abortions. 
New data also suggest that abortion has increased the sex-
ual exploitation of women.137 Far more men actually support 
the right to choose than women.138 Studies show that a major-
 
MED. 81, 8184 (1997) (refuting the link between abortion and breast cancer); 
Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of 
Data From 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast 
Cancer from 16 Countries, 363 THE LANCET 1007, 1007, 101314 (2004) 
(same). 
 132. See supra notes 12531; see generally DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF 
ABORTION (Thomas W. Strahan ed., 3d ed. 2001) (describing hundreds of stud-
ies demonstrating the negative effects of abortion). 
 133. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion 
Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence From Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 41730 (2003) (claiming that legalized abortion 
has caused an increase in the rate of sexually transmitted diseases due to 
abortions use as a contraceptive). 
 134. See Jean G. Spaulding & Jesse O. Cavenar, Jr., Psychoses Following 
Therapeutic Abortion, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 364, 36465 (1978) (citing ex-
amples of women developing eating disorders following abortions). 
 135. See, e.g., Albert D. Klassen & Sharon C. Wilsnack, Sexual Experience 
and Drinking Among Women in a U.S. National Survey, 15 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 363, 37677 (Oct. 1986) (noting the possibility of a link between abor-
tion and heavy drinking). 
 136. See, e.g., Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for 
Pregnancy-Associated MortalityMaryland, 19931998, 285 J. AM. MED. 
ASSN 1455, 1455 (2001) (concluding that homicide was the most likely cause of 
death for pregnant or recently pregnant women in Maryland); Kim Curtis, 
Murder: The Leading Cause of Death for Pregnant Women, NATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATION FOR WOMEN, Apr. 23, 2003, http://www.now.org/issues/violence/ 
043003pregnant.html; National Abortion Federation, The National Abortion 
Federation Urges Congress to Protect Pregnant Women Without Endangering 
Abortion Rights, (Feb. 26, 2004) http://www.prochoice.org/news/releases/ 
archive/20040226.html (stating that murder is the leading cause of death for 
pregnant women). 
 137. See The Consequences of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 23, 2005) (statement of Teresa 
Stanton Collett), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 
1553&wit_id=4396; see also RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 
21723 (describing the connection between abortion, failed interpersonal rela-
tionships, and male coercion). 
 138. See Quinnipiac University, U.S. Voters Back Roe v. Wade 2-1, Support 
Filibusters, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, (May 25, 2005), 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x11385.xml?ReleaseID=738; see also ARTHUR B. 
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ity of women choose abortion due to problems in their sexual 
relationships or their desire to avoid single parenthood because 
of male irresponsibility.139 Abortions often result from male co-
ercion.140 In particular, the right to abortion for minors has al-
lowed some men to escape statutory rape and abuse charges.141 
Under the Courts current jurisprudence, even the minimal 
statutes that combat this problem have been subject to wither-
ing scrutiny and often struck down.142 
One of the major claims of abortion proponents both in 
1973 and today is that if abortion is made illegal, women will 
have to resort to back-alley abortions where their lives will be 
in significant danger. This claim does not hold up under the 
weight of the facts. According to the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Preventions National Center for Health Statistics, 
from 1940 to 1972, deaths due to illegal abortions declined from 
1,313 to 41 annually.143 If Roe were overturned today, the inci-
 
SHOSTAK & GARY MCLOUTH WITH LYNN SENG, MEN AND ABORTION: LESSONS, 
LOSSES, AND LOVE (1984) (chronicling male attitudes toward abortion). 
 139. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have 
Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 169 (1988) (citing the fear of single par-
enthood as a major cause of abortion); see also Lawrence B. Finer et al., Rea-
sons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 
37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 110, 11213 (2005) (citing rela-
tionship problems, desire to avoid single parenthood, and unstable/abusive re-
lationships as major reasons for procuring an abortion). 
 140. RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 221; see generally THE 
ELLIOT INSTITUTE, FORCED ABORTION IN AMERICA: A SPECIAL REPORT, 
http://www.afterabortion.info/petition/Forced_Abortions.pdf (last visited Nov. 
5, 2005) (claiming that eighty percent of abortions are due to some sort of eco-
nomic, social, or psychological coercion, and that most women would choose 
not to have them given the choice). 
 141. See Hearing on H.R. 748 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of 
Teresa Stanton Collett), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Hearings.aspx? 
ID=90. 
 142. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 
937 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down Idahos parental consent statute), cert. de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 1694 (2005); Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 
F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2004) (striking down New Hampshires parental notifica-
tion statute), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
Eng., 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144). 
 143. Candace C. Crandall, Three Decades of Empty Promises, in THE COST 
OF CHOICE: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION, supra note 131, at 
17 (citing NATL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., SUPPLEMENT TO THE MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT: AD-
VANCE REPORTS 1986: SERIES 24, COMPILATIONS OF DATA ON NATALITY, MOR-
TALITY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND INDUCED TERMINATIONS OF PREGNANCY, 
NO. 3 (1986)). 
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dences of abortion deaths from illegal abortions would most 
likely be drastically less than in 1972 due to developments in 
technology, antibiotics, and the safety procedures of medical 
practice. A large percentage of illegal abortions performed prior 
to Roe were by licensed physicians.144 There is no reason to 
think this would be different today. 
Additionally, far from living up to Roes expectations about 
the future of womens health, abortion has become a full-
fledged multimillion-dollar industry in its own right.145 Former 
workers in abortion clinics have testified to a cattle herd men-
tality146 of abortion clinics that seek to be as efficient as possi-
ble. Fewer hospitals and fewer doctors are performing abor-
tions, forcing more patients into larger, urban clinics.147 
Because of privacy issues, many abortion clinics keep few re-
cords, and what they do keep is collected haphazardly.148 Most 
women who experience complications from abortion seek medi-
cal assistance from clinics other than the abortion provider, 
where the problem is rarely linked to, or recorded as, an abor-
tion complication.149 Thus, we truly do not know the full extent 
of the medical complications resulting from abortions. 
 
 144. See id. (citing Mary Calderone, Illegal Abortion as Public Health Prob-
lem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951 (1960) (noting that prior to Roe, nine out of 
ten illegal abortions were performed by licensed physicians)); see also Finley, 
supra note 82, at 369 (noting that Californias hearings to liberalize its abor-
tion laws in the 1960s would simply codify what doctors were, in fact, doing). 
 145. See Phyllis Schlafly, Ashcroft Stands Up to Abortion Industry, TOWN-
HALL.COM, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/phyllisschlafly/ 
ps20040308.shtml (describing Planned Parenthoods revenues and government 
funding). 
 146. See Womens Med. Ctr. of Nw. Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d 414, 
428 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (abortion provider described abortion clinics as having a 
cattle herd mentality) aff d in part and revd in part by Womens Med. Ctr. of 
Nw. Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 147. See Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later: From 
Choice to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783, 78389 (2004) (describing the 
failing business model of abortion clinics and their push for government 
money to stay in business). 
 148. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 59 (describing the 
reasons for the underreporting of data concerning postabortion complications); 
see also David C. Reardon, Limitations on Post-Abortion Research: Why We 
Know So Little, http://www.afterabortion.org/limits.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2005) (exploring the relative difficulty in obtaining accurate postabortion sta-
tistics). 
 149. See RING-CASSIDY & GENTLES, supra note 121, at 25568 (describing 
how research limited to short-term follow-up examinations limits the accuracy 
of postabortion research). 
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B. POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
In their commentary on the Lochner line of cases, the three 
Justices of the Casey plurality opinion stated that in 1937, a so-
cial consensus had been reached that Lochner was wrongly de-
cided.150 They went on to state that the sort of consensus that 
existed in 1937 was not present with regard to abortion (at 
least not in 1992).151 Leaving aside the question of the Justices 
historical accuracy, their statement implies that polls may play 
a role in determining whether a reversal of precedent is justi-
fied. Is it enough to have academic consensus stating that a 
case was wrongly decided, or is there a need for public consen-
sus? Judging from the plurality opinions desire to achieve 
some sort of social compromise on this divisive issue, Casey 
suggests that the Court considers the pulse of the nation im-
portant when adjudicating cases involving abortion.152 
The polls, however, indicate that the nation as a whole is 
less divided on the issue than is commonly portrayed. Much 
common ground exists among the populace regarding appropri-
ate regulations of abortionregulations that are frustrated by 
the Courts current jurisprudence. In a 2004 poll conducted by 
Zogby International, 56 percent of the population agreed with 
the proposition that at a maximum, abortion should be legal 
only in cases of rape, incest, or to preserve the life of the 
mother.153 Another 25 percent believed abortions should only be 
allowed during the first three months of pregnancy.154 Thus, 81 
percent of the population rejected the current abortion juris-
prudence of the Supreme Court. A 2003 CBS News Poll indi-
cated that 62 percent of those polled believed there should be 
stricter limits on abortion.155 Over 70 percent of those polled by 
USA Today/CNN/Gallup in 2003 stated that they would allow 
such regulations as right to know acts, waiting periods, pa-
rental consent for minors, spousal notification, and a ban on 
 
 150. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 86162 (1992). 
 151. Id. at 864 (Because the cases before us present no such occasion it 
could be seen as no such response.). 
 152. See id. at 85455. 
 153. Steven Ertelt, New Poll: Majority of Americans, Students, Blacks, Pro-
Life on Abortion, ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 26, 2004, http://www.zogby.com/ 
Soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=8087. 
 154. Id. 
 155. CBS News, Abortion Polls, (July 2003), http://www.sba-list.org/ 
polls08072003.cfm. 
ADKINS_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:52:55 AM 
526 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:500 
 
partial-birth abortion (D & X).156 The information from these 
polls reflects basic American attitudes toward abortion.157 
Thus, there appears to be a broad consensus that the current 
abortion regime is too lax and does not comport with the sensi-
bilities of the people. If the Justices are looking for public opin-
ion to help justify a reversal of precedent, ample polling data 
supports some kind of reversal of Roe. 
IV.  THE PATH OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REORIENTATION 
Constitutional values remain the same over time, but 
should be applied differently in regard to concrete historical 
circumstances. The Lochner era is the prototypical example of 
this sort of shift in constitutional values and provides a model 
for how todays Justices could overturn Roe v. Wade.158 At the 
same time, this transition need not jeopardize important con-
stitutional values like the right of privacy or the emerging doc-
trine of substantive due process as applied to noneconomic lib-
erties.159 A new Harlanite approach could forge a middle 
ground between the dogmatic assertion of a right that has its 
foundation in a judicial gloss on a particular constitutional text,  
 
 
 156. See Kathy Kiely, Abortion Battle Hits Pivotal Point, USA TODAY, Jan. 
15, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-15-abortion-usat_x 
.htm. 
 157. See Clark D. Forsythe, An Unnecessary Evil, 130 FIRST THINGS 21 
(2003) (referencing recent polling data on abortion); Lynn D. Wardle, The 
Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. 
REV. 853, 94548 (discussing recent trends in abortion polling data). 
 158. Lessig describes the interpretive process as one that relies on particu-
lar degrees of certainty. See Lessig, supra note 25, at 41014. If the meaning 
of the text or the idea behind the text is pretty certain, then courts may rule. 
In the New Deal context, prior to the 1930s, noninterventionism was largely 
assumed to be an absolute, unchanging truth. In that context, liberty clearly 
meant laissez-faire economics. However, as economic theory was challenged 
and contested, the Court had to take a more agnostic approach. See id. at 439. 
In this interpretive context, legislatures should get more deference. See id. 
The same principle applies to abortion. Since the facts and constitutional prin-
ciples of Roe are highly contested, the court should adopt a more agnostic, in-
terpretive approach and return the issue to the legislatures. See id.  
 159. As soon as the Court abandoned the old constitutional limitations on 
the police power, the Court crafted new ones in the famous footnote 4 from 
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See GILL-
MAN, supra note 66, at 204. Footnote 4 prevented judicial review from being 
swallowed by the Courts new deference to the police power and Congress, and 
became the basis for noneconomic substantive due process. See generally 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 22934 (2004) (discussing the advent of Footnote Four). 
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and a Holmesian legal positivism that would leave unenumer-
ated liberty interests for states to protect or not protect. This 
constitutional reorientation of values could provide a jurispru-
dential framework that would reaffirm the liberty interests as-
sociated with privacy, while taking the abortion issue out of the 
courts and into the legislatures for debate. As with right of con-
tract jurisprudence during the New Deal, current abortion ju-
risprudence has prevented the enactment of an enormous 
amount of socially popular legislation restricting abortion.160 It 
is time to return this issue to the legislature. 
A. LOCHNER REVISITED: THREE COMPETING APPROACHES TO 
ABORTION 
While there were three competing models for resolving the 
question of the balance of the police power and economic liber-
ties in Lochner, only the dogmatic strain of fundamental rights 
embodied in the Peckham opinion and the legal positivism of 
Holmess dissent are competing today. However, this Note 
seeks to resurrect a third approacha Harlanite theory that 
balances important constitutional values and liberties, while at 
the same time addresses the changed factual situation since 
1973.161 This approach offers a way out of the current debate 
over the merits of substantive due process, while upholding 
constitutional principles that are becoming more deeply em-
bedded in our constitutional framework. 
 
 
 160. Recently, federal courts have reviewed and struck down state parental 
notification and consent statutes that are enormously popular, as well as the 
federal partial-birth abortion ban that passed both houses of Congress by 
overwhelming majorities. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Was-
den, 376 F.3d 908, 92124 (9th Cir. 2004); Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. 
v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 5961 (1st Cir. 2004) (invalidating New Hampshires pa-
rental notification statute), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parent-
hood of N. New Eng., 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144) (striking down New 
Hampshires parental notification statute); Natl Abortion Fedn v. Ashcroft, 
330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 49293 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the Federal Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban of 2003 unconstitutional). 
 161. This does not take into account a fourth option, which is possibly the 
view of Justice Thomas, that there might be a right to life in the Constitution 
located in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Thomas has indicated that he is open to rethinking unenumer-
ated rights under this clause. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 52728 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POLY 63, 68 (1989). 
ADKINS_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:52:55 AM 
528 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:500 
 
The first approach to abortion jurisprudence maintains and 
affirms a broad fundamental right of sexual and reproductive 
autonomy that encompasses contraception, same-sex relations, 
and reproduction. But rather than asserting a general right to 
privacy, this jurisprudence upholds the right to engage in these 
particular practices by framing the right in question as sexual 
autonomy (which encompasses abortion). This approach pro-
tects the broader scope of activities that fall under the heading 
of sexual autonomy. Its my body, and I can do what I want 
with it would be the underlying attitude that this theory up-
holds. If this is the case, then police power regulations in this 
area would be immediately suspect as intrusions into funda-
mental rights under the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process 
Clause. This appears to be the philosophical basis for the plu-
rality opinion in Casey.162 As long as abortion is linked to a no-
tion of privacy that encompasses sexual autonomy, states will 
find it continually difficult to pass legislation limiting or regu-
lating abortion. This approach also mirrors that of the majority 
in Adkins, which attempted to uphold a vigorous doctrine of 
economic choice through the right of contract.163 
Opposite the rigid commitment to fundamental rights is 
the approach adopted by Justice Scalia. This jurisprudence 
maintains that substantive due process is a complete aberra-
tion of constitutional theory. As a product of this line of juris-
prudence, Roe (and perhaps, but not necessarily, Griswold) 
should be overturned and left to the states, as the Court should 
get its hands off an issue it had no business dealing with in the 
first place.164 This approach echoes Justice Holmess dissent in 
Lochner. Holmes believed that the constitutional text said 
nothing about the protection of particular economic liberties, 
and that the Court lacked the competency and the institutional 
mandate to do so.165 Likewise, in todays heated culture wars, 
Justice Scalia believes the Court has no special competence or 
 
 162. See STONER, supra note 41, at 73 (stating that while purporting to of-
fer greater latitude to abortion regulation, Caseys long-term purpose is to bet-
ter-ground the abortion right and expand the breadth of constitutionally-
guaranteed sexual autonomy). 
 163. See Adkins v. Childrens Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 
525, 54548 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 388400 (1937). 
 164. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 7576 (1905) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
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authority to adjudicate controversial moral issues better left to 
the states.166 The chief contribution of a Harlanite approach 
is that it provides an alternative to the dilemma between a 
rigid approach to fundamental rights and a broad legal positiv-
ism. 
B. A HARLANITE APPROACH TO ABORTION 
In Lochner, Justice Harlan gave priority to particular legis-
lative solutions, while at the same time noting that there was a 
particular liberty interest called the right of contract.167 How-
ever, he indicated that unless the intrusion was arbitrary or 
unreasonable, deference should be given to the legislature as 
the more appropriate finder of fact.168 This approach, adopted 
by Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel,169 emphasized the com-
munitys interest in regulating health, safety, morals and wel-
fare170 over the of the prerogatives of the individual. 
With regard to abortion, the Court could adopt a 
Harlanite approach that would overturn Roe, while at the 
same time upholding the constitutional value of privacy. How 
would this work? First of all, this approach to abortion juris-
prudence would recognize that Roe has been subject to wither-
ing criticism on both sides of the abortion debate, and has un-
dermined the Courts institutional legitimacy.171 Next, it would 
note the new communitarian ethic present in the culture,172 
and then examine the increasing amount of factual data pre-
 
 166. See generally KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SU-
PREME COURTS WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (2004) (citing numerous 
dissenting opinions where Scalia criticizes and laments the Courts attempt to 
adjudicate contested moral issues). 
 167. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 68. 
 169. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 170. Id. at 391 (overruling Adkins and stating that liberty is qualified by 
the states appropriate use of the police power); see also STONER, supra note 
41, at 14546 (highlighting various Justices attempts to apply economic data 
to traditional categories of jurisprudence). 
 171. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe 
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (the most famous academic critique of Roe); 
Ginsburg Touches on Roe v. Wade in Kansas, WTOP RADIO NETWORK, Mar. 
31, 2005, http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?nid=343&sid=443760 (stating 
that Roe went past the confines of normal constitutional jurisprudence); see 
also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE 19497 (2001) (comparing Roe 
v. Wade to Bush v. Gore as unwarranted judicial interventions into politics). 
 172. See David Brooks, The Virtues of Virtue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, at 
A29 (noting the rejection of the social experiments of the 1960s and 1970s). 
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sent with regard to both fetal development and abortions ad-
verse effect on women. Because of the datas complexity and 
abortions increasing number of unwelcome externalities,173 the 
rationale for the original holdings of Roe and Doe has been un-
dermined, and Roe should be reversed and returned to the 
states for adjudication. 
1. Nebbia Sets the Table 
It may be that Casey is the new Nebbia, providing the 
jurisprudential shift that will allow for a new version of West 
Coast Hotel to overturn Roe. Just as Nebbia abandoned the 
principle of neutrality that made distinctions between public 
and private economic activity,174 Casey abandoned Roes un-
workable, judicially created trimester framework.175 Casey also 
abandoned the strict framework of substantive due process, 
and refused to assert that abortion rights were fundamental. 
The Casey opinion attempted to allow a number of abortion 
regulations as long as they did not create an undue burden.176 
Gone is the emphasis on privacy (only mentioned three times 
in the opinion);177 in its place sits a new balancing test for 
weighing the states competing claims of interest in maternal 
and fetal health, as well as the reliance interest of women on 
the right to an abortion.178 However, it is impossible to read the 
Casey opinion as thwarting privacy interests or devaluing per-
sonal autonomy. It appears that the Court made a failed at-
tempt to construct a framework where the interest of protecting 
personal autonomy was balanced against important concerns 
about abortions consequences and the need to apply at least 
modest regulations to ensure abortion remained an informed 
choice.179 
Additionally, Casey prepared the way for a reconsideration 
of the factual underpinnings of Roe through its discussion of 
 
 173. See supra notes 11757 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 53037 (1934). 
 175. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 87273 (1992). 
 176. See id. at 879901. 
 177. See id. at 883, 896, 900. 
 178. STONER, supra note 41, at 72 (describing the transition from doctor-
patient privacy to general liberty between Roe and Casey). 
 179. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 96064 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (describing why Casey permitted states to enact statutes regulat-
ing the practice of abortion). 
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the Lochner line of cases.180 By noting that constitutional prece-
dents can be reversed when there are changed circumstances 
from the original holding,181 the Court echoed the rationale of 
West Coast Hotel. While Casey failed to consider what Roe had 
wrought, it created a jurisprudential basis for a future Su-
preme Court to respond to Judge Edith Joness exhortation182 
and reconsider the complexity of the abortion problem. Examin-
ing the facts, the Court should return the issue to the states as 
the more appropriate finder of fact. Perhaps Casey is not the 
worst constitutional decision of all time.183 
2. The Holding of West Coast Roe 
A Harlanite abortion holding could come in many forms. 
The most basic would be to simply overturn Roe and return 
abortion to the states. This approach would leave Griswold in-
tact, concluding that abortion was not part of the privacy 
found in either the Ninth Amendment or Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both invasions of privacy gener-
ally, and doctor-patient privacy specifically, could continue to 
be given strict scrutiny, with abortion being removed from the 
privacy penumbra because of the states interest in regulating 
its externalities184 and protecting potential life.185 A slightly 
modified version of this approach would alternatively identify 
abortion as a liberty interest in a category of doctor-patient pri-
vacy, or medical autonomy, which receives nondeferential ra-
tional basis review, or rational basis review with bite.186 
 
 180. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 86062. 
 181. Id. at 86364. 
 182. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All 
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) (discussing Casey). 
 184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 87576. 
 185. Id. at 871. 
 186. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 63136 (1995) (striking down 
a Colorado constitutional amendment banning special protection for gays); 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding un-
constitutional, on equal protection grounds, a citys denial of a housing permit 
to a home for the mentally challenged); see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 
220, 22729 (6th Cir. 2002) (striking down Tennessees casket-seller regula-
tions as irrational restrictions on a basic liberty interestthe right to enter 
the profession of ones choice); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation 
Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Eco-
nomic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 
68085 (2004) (arguing that the Sixth Circuits holding in Giles serves as a 
model for nondeferential rational basis review of liberty interests, particularly 
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Thus, unreasonable or arbitrary invasions into this sphere of 
relations, such as preventing the preservation of a womans life, 
would be considered unconstitutional. This approach resembles 
right of contract jurisprudence prior to Lochner, which applied 
nondeferential rational basis review to interferences with pri-
vate contracts. 
Furthermore, a Harlanite approach need not leave abor-
tion rights completely unprotected. While overturning Roe, the 
Court could forbid any regulation that prevents an adult from 
using the abortion providers in other states.187 The Court could 
review overly broad or vague laws that criminalize abortion 
without providing clear direction regarding the boundaries of 
lawful activities.188 Thus, broad and blanket bans on the proce-
dure would be subject to exacting scrutiny. Finally, the Court 
could overturn Roe, but also redefine the Doe definition of 
health to mean any situation where a womans life or physi-
cal wellbeing is in immediate danger. Thus, abortion would 
remain a fundamental right in all circumstances where a com-
petent medical professional deems it is necessary to preserve 
the health of the mother. Further provisions could also be 
made for extreme cases such as rape or incest. Thus, a 
Harlanite approach could preserve the doctor-patient privacy 
so important in 1973 when Roe was decided, while contempo-
raneously curbing the fear that some states will be too extreme 
in their regulation of abortion. Each of these approaches has 
the virtue of providing space for legislatures to address the 
abortion question, while at the same time affirming basic pri-
vacy and autonomy interests on which there is still broad con-
sensus. 
 
economic liberty). 
 187. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 50104 (1999) (holding that the right 
to travel between states was protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 188. This proposition seems to be similar to the view adopted by William 
Eskridge. Eskridge states that Justice Blackmuns original draft of the Roe 
opinion would have voided the Texas law (and the most intrusive abortion 
statutes) on vagueness grounds and returned the issue to the states to be ad-
judicated on the bases of the facts and the record. See Eskridge, supra note 15, 
at 1080. According to Eskridge, compromise and accommodation would have 
prevailed, and the cultural storm that followed the decision would have been 
avoided. See id. 
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3. A Harlanite Approach Does Not Jeopardize Other 
Liberties 
Some may argue that overturning Roe will call into ques-
tion important holdings in other cases such as Griswold v. 
Connecticut189 and Lawrence v. Texas.190 However, any of the 
Harlanite approaches outlined above would uphold these de-
cisions because of the gross and largely irrational intrusion into 
basic and fundamental liberty interests at issue in those 
cases.191 Government intrusion into private homes to regulate 
sex acts is both unenforceable and an arbitrary and deep intru-
sion into personal autonomy, thus conforming to the sort of ex-
ceptions that Justice Harlans approach accounted for in 
Lochner. 
Additionally, a Harlanite holding could take the more 
radical step of giving nondeferential rational basis review to 
privacy interests protected by the liberty of the Due Process 
Clause. This approach maintains the substantive rights pro-
tected by the Clause, but balances them against community po-
lice power interests. Pierce v. Society of Sisters,192 Meyer v. Ne-
braska,193 and Lawrence v. Texas194 would be models, as each 
applies nontraditional substantive due process review to find 
arbitrary intrusions into basic liberty interests.195 This ap-
 
 189. 381 U.S. 479, 48586 (1965) (holding that a general right to marital 
privacy is implicit in the provisions of the Constitution). 
 190. 539 U.S. 558, 57879 (2003) (striking down state antisodomy as viola-
tive of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 191. See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 
116667 (2004) (claiming that Lawrence is a gay rights West Coast Hotel be-
cause it reflected a new understanding of the humanity of gays and their place 
in society as it overturned Bowers v. Hardwick and its purportedly faulty fac-
tual assumptions). 
 192. 268 U.S. 510, 53436 (1925) (protecting the liberty of parents to direct 
upbringing). 
 193. 262 U.S. 390, 40003 (1923) (providing teachers the right to teach and 
parents the right to have their children taught). 
 194. 539 U.S. 558, 57779 (2003) (recognizing the freedom of thought, be-
lief, expression, and intimate conduct). 
 195. Recall that Griswold, Casey, and Lawrence were decided on grounds 
that differed from traditional substantive due process methodology. In addi-
tion, the opinion in Lawrence does not use the classic terminology of substan-
tive due process such as fundamental rights and strict scrutiny. See Randy 
E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1585, 1587 (2005) (describing how Justice Kennedys Law-
rence opinion would have merited a poor grade on a first year constitutional 
law exam because of its minimal application of substantive due process meth-
odology). 
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proach gives broad latitude to the states police power, but rec-
ognizes its limitations in relationship to basic rights, especially 
privacy and relational self-determination. Once again, impor-
tant constitutional values are preserved, even with a more 
radical holding.196 
CONCLUSION 
This Note calls for a new Harlanite approach in dealing 
with the question of abortion, and liberty interests in gen-
eral.197 This approach defers to legislative initiative, as well as 
serves as a bulwark against arbitrary intrusions into basic lib-
erty interests. The Lochner line of cases provides a concrete 
historical example of how changes in factual circumstances can 
lead to a reprioritization of constitutional values. Strict consti-
tutional protection of abortion is no longer necessary, and ex-
perience tells us that abortion has been harmful to women both 
physically and psychologically. 
The question of abortion has unnecessarily poisoned na-
tional politics and has prevented important discussions from 
taking place on a number of important issues, particularly in 
 
 196. Theoretically, however, even the end of substantive due process alto-
gether might not be a threat to basic rights such as privacy. Griswold was de-
cided under the penumbra theory that would locate unenumerated rights 
within the sphere of the Ninth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 48485 (1965). Overturning Roe could be the end of the controversial 
methodology of substantive due process and an opportunity to locate unenu-
merated rights in other areas of the constitutional text, such as the Ninth 
Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See generally BARNETT, supra note 159, at 23442 (arguing that 
the Constitution contains a presumption of liberty that should allow for the 
recognition of unenumerated rights, particularly within the Ninth Amend-
ment). 
 197. The key to the return of a Harlanite approach is Justice Anthony 
Kennedy. Kennedys opinions represent a Harlanite strain within the Court 
because he seeks to preserve liberties against arbitrary intrusions; however, 
he works outside the typical framework of substantive due process. His opin-
ion in Lawrence v. Texas is a perfect example of a narrow holding that 
preserves a basic liberty interest without pulling the carpet out from under-
neath the police power. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 56279. Likewise, he has 
shown great dissatisfaction with how Casey has been applied, and seems will-
ing to revisit the question, especially in light of his about-face in the death 
penalty cases. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 11872000 (2005) (hold-
ing unconstitutional juvenile death penalty laws). Judging from his dissenting 
opinion in Stenberg, Justice Kennedy seems to have wanted to make room for 
all sorts of regulations that do not interfere with the basic liberty interest of 
procuring an abortion, including even total bans after viability. See Stenberg 
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 95679 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the selection of the judiciary. Had the Court not usurped states 
authority to regulate abortion and imposed an extraordinarily 
radical and uniform system on the nation, it can be assumed 
that with the passage of time, a broad consensus would have 
developed, with some states having more liberalized laws than 
others.198 Once the question is returned to the states, this con-
versation can occur in local communities, where there is a 
deeper sense of shared values than at the national level. There 
can be unity through diversity.199 
 
 198. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1080 (lamenting the Courts decision 
to impose a uniform system of abortion on states that were moving toward 
democratically liberalizing their abortion laws); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. 
L. REV. 375, 38586 & n.81 (1985) (questioning the wisdom of Roe in light of 
the emergence of liberalized abortion laws prior to the decision). 
 199. See Benjamin Wittes, Letting Go of Roe, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 48 (noting that the Democratic Partys commitment to pre-
serving Roe v. Wade has been deeply unhealthy for American democracy, for 
liberalism, and even for the cause of abortion rights itself); see also Cynthia 
Gorney, Imagine a Nation Without Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 
A16 (noting the diversity of abortion laws that would emerge following a re-
versal of Roe). 
